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Note 
SOMEONE TALKED!1  THE NECESSITY OF 
PROHIBITIONS AGAINST PUBLISHING 
CLASSIFIED FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE 
INFORMATION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For a moment, imagine a nightmare scenario for this nation.2  The 
terrorist organization al Qaeda, never quenching in its appetite for the 
destruction of America by ruthlessly murdering her civilians, acquires a 
nuclear weapon after purchasing it from a rogue nation such as Iran or 
North Korea.  The purchase involves millions of dollars, accumulated 
from various donations, “charities,” and other gifts from entities that 
support al Qaeda’s objectives.  The funds, normally held in European 
bank accounts subject to tracking, are instead clandestinely held and 
physically carried by persons and entities throughout the United States, 
Europe, and the Middle East, eventually getting to terrorist leaders in 
Pakistan.  The funds are given to the rogue nation in exchange for the 
nuclear suitcase bomb. 
The nuclear weapon is transported via numerous al Qaeda 
operatives onto a ship in the French port of Marseilles.  The ship, 
normally carrying only legitimate exports, sails to the port of Miami, 
where the container carrying the weapon is smuggled.  The container is 
placed on a semi-truck and driven by a terrorist operative to 
Washington, D.C.  Upon arrival, a sleeper cell hides the bomb and awaits 
a message from terrorist leaders overseas for the date of detonation.  
Families of the sleeper cell, still living in the Middle East, each have been 
given thousands of dollars; a few years ago, the money would have been 
extracted from an al Qaeda bank account and digitally transferred to the 
families’ bank accounts.  Instead, the money is physically handed over. 
                                                 
1 A portion of the title of this Note is a reproduction of a famous World War II poster 
slogan, depicting a drowning sailor.  The National Archives, http://www.archives.gov/ 
research/ww2/photos/images/ww2-26.jpg (last visited Mar. 7, 2008) (for an illustration of 
the poster). 
2 This scenario is a hypothetical invented by the author. 
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Throughout the multiple month process of planning and executing 
the plot, thousands of communications have occurred.  In the recent past, 
many of the contacts with the sleeper cell in America would have been 
sent though e-mails and telephone calls.  However, in this case, the 
communications occur by persons flying to and from Europe, where 
operatives meet in safe houses.  The few e-mails that are sent are 
encrypted in elaborate code. 
At a final meeting at a safe house in Europe, a member of the sleeper 
cell is told of the date of the proposed attack in Washington, a 
communication that may have previously occurred by a telephone 
communication.  A week later, the attack occurs, killing hundreds of 
thousands of civilians and government employees, causing billions of 
dollars of damage, and causing unfathomable grief to families and 
strangers alike throughout America and around the world. 
While the preceding scenario is frightening to imagine, such plots 
may be in the planning stages by those persons who spend every waking 
moment designing ways to destroy the United States.  Each step of the 
scheme involves secrecy and silence, a difficult task to accomplish, 
especially if al Qaeda does not know America’s tactics of detecting the 
terrorist organization’s operations.  However, now imagine that the 
terrorists have learned of two of the most top secret methods that 
America currently uses to foil terrorist plots.  They have gained this 
knowledge neither through spies embedded in the State Department, nor 
by blackmailing families of government leaders, but rather by simply 
reading the front pages of major American newspapers.  The reader need 
not imagine this portion of the scenario, for it has already occurred.3 
Currently, the Federal Criminal Code includes two provisions that 
attempt to prohibit certain classified information from being published, 
the Espionage Act and the COMINT statute.4  However, the language 
and legislative history of the Espionage Act are difficult to fully 
understand, and such ambiguity causes it to be ineffective as it relates to 
disclosures through publishing.5  Additionally, the COMINT statute, 
while explicitly outlawing the publication of certain communications 
intelligence, is too narrow to encompass other classified intelligence 
disclosures, the secrecy of which are crucial to national security 
interests.6  Therefore, this Note proposes an additional provision to the 
                                                 
3 See infra Part II.E. 
4 See infra Parts II.A-B. 
5 See infra Part III.A. 
6 See infra note 37 for full text of the statute. 
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Federal Criminal Code that would prohibit the publishing of classified 
information which relates to the financial intelligence activities of the 
United States.7 
This Note explores the balance between freedom of the press and 
necessary legislation to counter fears that some published information 
may harm national security, and whether such laws should be enforced 
and updated.  Part II of this Note examines the history of current laws 
such as the Espionage Age and the COMINT statute, the subsequent 
enforcement of those laws, and the actions of the New York Times that 
may have violated those statutes.8  Next, Part III inspects whether the 
Espionage Act or COMINT statutes are sufficiently comprehensible to 
encompass the articles published by the Times and whether public policy 
considerations sanction such a prosecution.9  Furthermore, Part IV 
proposes additional necessary legislation that would encompass 
disclosures related to the financial activities of the United States against 
which current laws do not protect.10 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The balance between protecting confidential national security 
information and the public’s right to know has undergone various 
adjustments throughout this country’s history, especially as foreign 
affairs transformed.  Part II.A explores the evolution of the Espionage 
Act’s creation, with particular emphasis not only on its legislative history 
and the historic events that led to its enactment, but also the Act’s 
ambiguity.11  Juxtaposing those provisions, Part II.B presents the 
COMINT statute, including an analysis of its language and legislative 
intent.12  Next, Part II.C examines the extent to which the Pentagon 
Papers case affects current assessments of the prohibitions on the 
publication of national security information.13  Then, Part II.D considers 
subsequent judicial decisions that have reinforced the importance of 
national security secrecy and trends towards its protection.14  Finally, 
Part II.E reviews the New York Times’ recent disclosures of the 
government’s program to monitor international communications 
                                                 
7 See infra Part IV. 
8 See infra Part II. 
9 See infra Part III. 
10 See infra Part IV. 
11 See infra Part II.A. 
12 See infra Part II.B. 
13 See infra Part II.C. 
14 See infra Part II.D. 
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without a court warrant, as well as its program of tracking terrorist 
financial activity.15 
A. The Espionage Act 
To fully understand the meaning and potential application of 18 
U.S.C. § 798, one must first grasp the way in which the fragile balance 
between national security secrets and the freedoms of speech and press 
have garnered attention in the legislative branch.  For much of this 
nation’s history, people who engaged in unauthorized disclosures of 
government secrets were punished under general statutes regarding 
treason, unlawful entry into military bases, and theft of government 
property.16  Thereafter, Congress directly considered the issue of 
protecting government secrets in the early twentieth century when it 
passed the Defense Secrets Act of 1911 (“DSA”).17  The DSA, which was a 
                                                 
15 See infra Part II.E. 
16 Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense 
Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 940 (1973) (describing in much detail the federal 
espionage statutes, focusing on how the Espionage Act’s language is difficult to fully 
understand, and concluding that the basic espionage statutes are insufficiently drafted). 
17 Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 939-40 (quoting 36 Stat. 1804 (1911)).  The statute 
provides: 
 SEC. 1. That whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information 
respecting the national defense, to which he is not lawfully entitled, 
goes upon any vessel, or enters any navy-yard, naval station, fort, 
battery, torpedo station, arsenal, camp, factory, building, office, or 
other place connected with the national defense, owned or constructed 
or in process of construction by the United States, or in the possession 
or under the control of the United States or any of its authorities or 
agents, and whether situated within the United States or in any place 
non-contiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof; or whoever, 
when lawfully or unlawfully upon any vessel, or in or near any such 
place, without proper authority, obtains, takes, or makes, or attempts 
to obtain, take, or make, any document, sketch, photograph, 
photographic negative, plan, model, or knowledge of anything 
connected with the national defense to which he is not entitled; or 
whoever, without proper authority, receives or obtains, or undertakes 
or agrees to receive or obtain, from any person, any such document, 
sketch, photograph, photographic negative, plan, model, or 
knowledge, knowing the same to have been so obtained, taken or 
made; or whoever, having possession of or control over any such 
document, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, plan, model, or 
knowledge, willfully and without proper authority, communicates or 
attempt to communicate the same to any person not entitled to receive 
it, or to whom the same ought not, in the interest of the national 
defense, be communicated at that time; or whoever, being lawfully 
entrusted with any such document, sketch, photograph, photographic 
negative, plan, model, or knowledge, willfully and in breach of his 
trust, so communicates or attempts to communicate the same, shall be 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 4 [2008], Art. 6
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precursor to various important sections of the current Espionage Act, 
penalized the illegal stealing, gathering, and generic communicating of 
information from in and around military installations.18  Moreover, 
section two of the statute imposed a harsher penalty on the passing of 
such information to a foreign government.19  In the extensive list of types 
of actions punishable, “publishes” was not included.20 
A few years later, just two days after the United States entered 
World War I, Congress began debating the next major piece of legislation 
dealing with the protection of national security information, the 
Espionage Act of 1917.21  The DSA was included in the new Espionage 
                                                                                                             
fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more 
than one year, or both. 
 SEC. 2.  That whoever, having committed any offense defined in 
the preceding section, communicates or attempts to communicate to 
any foreign government, or to any agent or employee thereof, any 
document, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, plan, model, or 
knowledge so obtained, taken, or made, or so entrusted to him, shall 
be imprisoned not more than ten years. 
Id.  A small amount of discussion occurred as to these provisions, as the House Judiciary 
Committee report is five pages long.  H.R. Rep. No. 1941, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. (1911).  The 
House of Representatives debate covered less than two pages of the Congressional Record.  
46 CONG. REC. 2029-30 (1911).  The Senate’s discussions of the provisions also lacked 
extensive scrutiny.  Id. at 3516. 
18 36 Stat. 1804 (1911).  Of the little discussion in the House regarding the statute, House 
Judiciary Chairman Parker was asked about the meaning of the phrase “to which he is 
[not] entitled.”  46 CONG. REC. 2030 (1911).  Chairman Parker replied that the first draft of 
the statute included the word “wrongfully,” but the Committee determined that not 
entitled was less ambiguous than wrongfully.  Id.  However, the Chairman did not specify 
as to how “not entitled” was any less vague than the previous language.  Edgar & Schmidt, 
supra note 16, at 1003.  Such sloppy language throughout the statute was adopted by 
subsequent legislation.  Id. at 1005 (explaining that “the formless terms of the 1911 Act were 
accorded a respect and a putative clarity in later legislative stages out of all keeping with 
the casual process that spawned them”). 
19 36 Stat. 1804 (1911). 
20 Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 940. 
21 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (current version included in 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (2006)).  The 
statutes, which have undergone little material alterations since their passage, have now 
been codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(a)–(d) and § 794.  In full §§ 793(a)–(d) state: 
(a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the 
national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is 
to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any 
foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains 
information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, navy 
yard, naval station, submarine base, fueling station, fort, battery, 
torpedo station, dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine, 
telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office, 
research laboratory or station or other place connected with the 
national defense owned or constructed, or in progress of construction 
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Act, with the amendment that its prohibitions were criminal only when 
accompanied by “intent or reason to believe that the information is to be 
used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign 
nation.”22 
                                                                                                             
by the United States or under the control of the United States, or of any 
of its officers, departments, or agencies, or within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States, or any place in which any vessel, 
aircraft, arms, munitions, or other materials or instruments for use in 
time of war are being made, prepared, repaired, stored, or are the 
subject of research or development, under any contract or agreement 
with the United States, or any department or agency thereof, or with 
any person on behalf of the United States, or otherwise on behalf of the 
United States, or any prohibited place so designated by the President 
by proclamation in time of war or in case of national emergency in 
which anything for the use of the Army, Navy or Air Force is being 
prepared or constructed or stored, information as to which prohibited 
place the President has determined would be prejudicial to the 
national defense; or 
(b) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason 
to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts to copy, take, 
make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, 
blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document, 
writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense; or 
(c) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or 
attempts to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source 
whatever, any such document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, 
photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, 
instrument, appliance, or note, of anything connected with the national 
defense, knowing or having reason to believe, at the time he receives 
or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain it, that it has been 
or will be obtained, taken, made, or disposed of by any person 
contrary to the provisions of this chapter; or 
(d) Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or 
being entrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, 
sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, 
model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, 
or information relating to the national defense which information the 
possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the 
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully 
communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated, 
delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, 
transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the 
same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the 
same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the 
United States entitled to receive it . . . shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 
Id. 
22 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (current version included in 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (2006)).  See supra 
note 21.  The provisions extended the 1911 Act significantly, as they include prohibitions 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 4 [2008], Art. 6
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As debate concerning the Act was ongoing, President Wilson’s 
administration encouraged Congress to include in the Act a provision 
that would enable the prosecution of persons or entities that published 
any type of defense information.23  The section was eventually defeated 
by close votes in both houses of Congress.24  The only prohibition against 
publication that was passed is now included in 18 U.S.C. § 794(b), which 
mandates punishment for the publication of military information in a 
time of war with intent or reason to believe that the United States will be 
injured or a foreign nation will be aided.25 
                                                                                                             
against those persons who possess both lawful and illegally-obtained national defense 
information.  Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1005-06. 
23 The proposal provided that: 
[d]uring any national emergency resulting from a war to which the 
United States is a party, or from threat of such a war, the President 
may, by proclamation, declare the existence of such emergency and, by 
proclamation, prohibit the publishing or communicating of, or the 
attempting to publish or communicate any information relating to the 
national defense which, in his judgment, is of such character that it is 
or might be useful to the enemy.  Whoever violates any such 
prohibition shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by 
imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both: Provided, That 
nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or restrict any 
discussion, comment, or criticism of the acts or policies of the 
Government or its representatives or the publication of the same. 
55 CONG. REC. 1763; see also Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 940. 
24 Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 956.  The Senate defeated bill 8148 by a vote of 39 to 
38, with 19 Senators choosing not to vote.  Id.  The bill would have prohibited, in wartime 
but without any culpability requirement, a person or entity from publishing or 
communicating a large range of defense information, including information regarding 
movement of armed forces, war materials, plans of military operations, “or any other 
information relating to the public defense or calculated to be, or which might be, useful to 
the enemy.”  N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Edgar & Schmidt, supra 
note 16, at 947.  Republican Senator Albert B. Cummins claimed that the act gave too much 
power to the executive branch.  Id.  He argued that “[u]nder this provision the President 
can absolutely command silence in the United States upon every subject mentioned . . . .  
He can suppress every suggestion concerning the national defense in every newspaper of 
the land.”  54 CONG. REC. 3492 (1917); Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 947.  A similar 
provision in the House bill was defeated by a vote of 221 to 167, with one answering 
“present” and 43 abstaining.  Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 960-61. 
25 18 U.S.C. § 794(b) provides: 
Whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be 
communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or 
communicates, or attempts to elicit any information with respect to the 
movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of 
the Armed Forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the United States, 
or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or conduct 
of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or 
measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the 
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In 1938, Congress passed three additional sections of the Espionage 
Statutes which dealt with photographing and military installations and 
subsequent publishing or sale of them.26  These statutes, which are 
relatively straightforward, produced very little congressional debate, 
and few prosecutions have stemmed from them.27 
One additional subsection of section 793, inserted in 1950, must be 
mentioned before a deeper discussion of the statutes’ language can be 
examined.28  Following World War II, Congress passed the Internal 
Security Act of 1950, which included section 793(e), prohibiting anyone 
who had unauthorized defense information from the willful 
communication of it to those persons or entities not entitled to receive 
it.29  Additionally, Congress created an offense for the simple retention of 
such material.30 
                                                                                                             
fortification or defense of any place, or any other information relating 
to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy, shall be 
punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life. 
Id.; see also Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 940-41.  President Wilson’s provision was 
defeated in part because Wilson’s political opponents feared that it could be used to silence 
criticism of America’s entrance into the World War I.  Id. at 941.  It was feared that any 
disapproval of foreign affairs could be muffled via the excuse that it was protecting 
national security secrets.  Id.; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage 
Act of 1917: A Mystery Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 346-49 (2003) (discussing the heated 
debate over the “press censorship” provision). 
26 18 U.S.C. §§ 795-97 (2006). 
27 Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1071. 
28 See infra Part III.A. 
29 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2006).  In full, the statute reads: 
Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over 
any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, 
photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, 
appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information 
relating to the national defense which information the possessor has 
reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to 
the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, 
transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or 
attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be 
communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not 
entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it 
to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive 
it…[s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten 
years, or both. 
Id.; see also Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1022 (commenting “that for the third time in 
as many attempts, Congress had virtually no understanding of the language and effect of 
793(d) and (e)”). 
30 18 U.S.C. § 793(e). 
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As mentioned earlier, phrases such as “intent or reason to believe 
that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to 
the advantage of any foreign nation,” “relating to the national defense,” 
and “any person not entitled to receive it” are located throughout the 
Espionage Act.31  Extensive scholarly writings have attempted to bring 
understanding to these ambiguous phrases, with little success.32  Indeed, 
when two Columbia law professors, Harold Edgar and Benno C. 
Schmidt, Jr., analyzed the statutes in the 1970s, in what is perhaps the 
definitive examination of the provisions, they concluded that “the 
statutes implacably resist the effort to understand.”33 
The legislative history of sections 793 and 794 indicates that although 
Congress refused to pass President Wilson’s broad press censorship 
proposal, it instead adopted these statutes, and in doing so did not 
intend to prohibit journalists from publishing defense information.34  
However, the plain language of the statutes themselves does not exclude 
the publication of defense information from their prohibitive reach.35  
Thus, although there continues to be uncertainty as to whether a 
journalist could be prosecuted under these statutes after publishing 
national security secrets, there does exist one other Federal Criminal 
Code provision that, after examining both its legislative history and its 
plain language, points towards the likely permittance of such 
prosecution.36 
                                                 
31 Such phrases are found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(a)–(e) and 794(a).  For clarification 
purposes, throughout the rest of this Note, when “Espionage Act” is mentioned, it will 
refer only to 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–794. 
32 See, e.g., United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 613 (E.D. Va. 2006) (stating that 
the Act has been “criticized . . . as excessively complex, confusing, indeed impenetrable.”); 
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 753 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(commenting that § 793(e) as a “singularly opaque statute”); Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 
16, at 941-42 (“Unfortunately, the proponents of culpability requirements were more 
concerned with obtaining their inclusion than elucidating their meaning.  Ambiguity 
pervades the Espionage Act . . . .”); Jereen Trudell, Note, The Constitutionality of Section 793 
of the Espionage Act and Its Application to Press Leaks, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 205, 211 (1986) (“[I]t 
is impossible to determine exactly what Congress meant when it enacted the statute.”). 
33 Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 930. 
34 Id. at 1057 (“Congress demonstrated by the narrowing and ultimate rejection of the 
Wilson Administration’s broad proposed prohibition on publication of defense information 
that it did not intend to enact prohibitions on publication or communication motivated by 
the desire to engage in public debate or private discussion”). 
35 Id. at 937 (“[T]he language of the statutes has to be bent somewhat to exclude 
publishing national defense material from its [criminal] reach, and tortured to exclude from 
criminal sanction preparatory conduct necessarily involved in almost every conceivable 
publication” of military secrets). 
36 See infra Part II.B. 
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B. The COMINT Statute 
In 1950, Congress passed another provision to the Federal Criminal 
Code, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 798, which prohibited, among other things, 
the willful publishing of classified United States information related to 
communication intelligence.37  In enacting this provision, Congress 
                                                 
37 18 U.S.C. § 798.  The statute, titled “Disclosure of [C]lassified [I]nformation,” provides: 
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, 
transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or 
publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of 
the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the 
detriment of the United States any classified information– 
(1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, 
cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any 
foreign government; or 
(2) concerning the design, construction, use, maintenance, or 
repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or 
prepared or planned for use by the United States or any 
foreign government for cryptographic or communication 
intelligence purposes; or 
(3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of 
the United States or any foreign government; or 
(4) obtained by the processes of communication intelligence 
from the communications of any foreign government, 
knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes – 
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or 
both. 
(b) As used in this subsection (a) of this section – 
The term “classified information” means information which, at the 
time of a violation of this section, is, for reasons of national security, 
specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for 
limited or restricted dissemination or distribution; 
The terms “code,” “cipher,” and “cryptographic system” include in 
their meanings, in addition to their usual meanings, any method of 
secret writing and any mechanical or electrical device or method used 
for the purpose of disguising or concealing the contents, significance, 
or meanings of communications; 
The term “foreign government” includes in its meaning any person or 
persons acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any faction, 
party, department, agency, bureau, or military force of or within a 
foreign country, or for or on behalf of any government or any person 
or persons purporting to act as a government within a foreign country, 
whether or not such government is recognized by the United States; 
The term “communications intelligence” means all procedures and 
methods used in the interception of communications and the obtaining 
of information from such communications by other than the intended 
recipients; 
The term “unauthorized person” means any person who, or agency 
which, is not authorized to receive information of the categories set 
forth in subsection (a) of this section, by the President, or by the head 
of a department or agency of the United States Government which is 
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targeted a very narrow category of information that it deemed crucially 
important to be protected from our nation’s enemies.38  The provision, 
which has come be known as the COMINT statute, was enacted in direct 
response to a newspaper article published by the Chicago Tribune in the 
midst of World War II.39  Shortly following America’s victory over Japan 
at the battle of Midway, the Tribune ran a front-page article that disclosed 
the highly secretive information that the strength, nature, and even 
individual ship names of the approaching Japanese task forces were 
known to the United States commanders days prior to the engagement, 
with the reasonable conclusion that Japan’s naval codes had been 
broken.40  Since its exposure threatened to lengthen the war and thus 
lead to further military deaths, both the War Department and Justice 
Department encouraged a prosecution under the Espionage Act, and by 
August 1942, prosecutors had brought the issue before a federal grand 
jury.41  However, the government subsequently decided to drop the 
charges to eliminate the risk of disseminating additional classified 
information to the jurors.42  Even if charges had been brought to finality, 
                                                                                                             
expressly designated by the President to engage in communication 
intelligence activities for the United States. 
Id. 
38 H.R. Rep. No. 81-1895, at 2 (1950).  The House Judiciary Committee concluded that 
Section 798 “is an attempt to provide just such legislation for only a small category of 
classified matter, a category which is both vital and vulnerable to an almost unique 
degree.”  Id. 
39 Gabriel Schoenfeld, Has the New York Times Violated the Espionage Act?, COMMENTARY, 
Mar. 2006, at 24-25 (discussing possible statutes that could or could not be utilized against 
the New York Times for its disclosure of the classified NSA program).  COMINT simply 
stands for communications intelligence, and: 
refers to those activities that produce intelligence by interception and 
processing of foreign communications passed by radio, wire, or other 
electromagnetic means . . . and by the processing of foreign encrypted 
communications, however transmitted.  Interception comprises search, 
intercept, and direction-finding.  Processing comprises range 
estimation, transmitter operator identification, signal analysis, traffic 
analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plaintext, the fusion of 
these processes, and the reporting of the results . . . . 
DESMOND BALL, SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 122 (1993) (quoting 
U.S. National Security Council Directive no. 6, 17 Feb. 1972). 
40 See Navy Had Work of Jap Plan to Strike at Sea, CHI. TRIBUNE, June 7, 1942, at A1.  The 
critical information, attributed to “reliable sources in . . . naval intelligence,” disclosed one 
of the outstanding breakthroughs of Allied forces in the war, which would surely continue 
to serve American war efforts to a great degree if Japan did not know that it had been 
broken and continued to use the same cryptographic system.  Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 
24. 
41 Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 25. 
42 Id.  Additionally, the Japanese continued to use their same cryptographic system, JN-
25, either because they never learned of the Tribune article, or persisted to believe that their 
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it is questionable whether the newspaper or its journalists would have 
been convicted under sections 793 or 794.43 
Thus, in Congress’ passage of section 798, it certainly had the Tribune 
incident in mind when it directed criminal sanctions at disclosures of 
sensitive communications intelligence.44  Indeed, Congress twice had 
refused to adopt a measure that would have made a person’s 
unauthorized disclosure of any classified information subject to criminal 
prosecution.45  Therefore, the COMINT statute was drafted especially 
with the rationale of balancing public debate and the necessary security 
of national defense material and information.46 
Moreover, the COMINT statute as written and enacted was a “model 
of precise draftsmanship.”47  As the provision unambiguously asserts via 
its explicit use of the word “publishes,” section 798 is a proscription 
upon public speech that is directly aimed at preventing newspapers, 
magazines, and similar media from making known certain 
communications intelligence.48  Additionally, the law’s mens rea 
requirement is met upon knowingly and willfully accomplishing the 
forbidden disclosure, without any additional condition that the 
information be used to injure the United States or aid a foreign country.49  
Moreover, Congress dodged additional potential application difficulties 
by declining to include any prerequisite that America be at war.50 
Perhaps indicating the overwhelming support of the statute, and in 
light of the recent Chicago Tribune article and the deliberate contraction to 
                                                                                                             
codes were unbreakable.  Id. at 24-25; see generally DAVID KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS (1967) 
(explaining the history of secret communications, including the Japanese in World War II). 
43 See infra Part III.A. 
44 Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 28. 
45 Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1056.  See REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE 
INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, S. Doc. No. 79-244 (1946); S. 1019, 80th 
Cong. (1950); S. 2680, 80th Cong. (1950).  The proposals would have criminalized the 
“revelation or publication, not only of direct information about United States codes and 
ciphers themselves but of information transmitted in United States codes and ciphers.”  
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1068.  Such provisions would have prohibited 
publication regarding a large amount of military and diplomatic dispatches and 
information sent by the government via codes and ciphers both internationally and 
intranationally.  Id. 
46 Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 28. 
47 Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1065. 
48 Id.; see also Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 28. 
49 Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1065. 
50 Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 28; see also Michael D. Ramsey, Presidential Declarations of 
War, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 321 (2003) (discussing the evolution of the official declaration of 
war in the United States). 
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the narrow amount of information prohibited by the statute, the House 
of Representatives passed section 798 without substantive debate.51  
Moreover, the Senate conducted very little discussion prior to passing it, 
as well.52  As Edgar and Schmidt have pointed out, the provision had 
been drafted “with concern for public speech having been thus 
respected,” and had even been supported by the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors.53 
C. The Pentagon Papers: Watering the Seeds of Prosecution 
Perhaps the most famous Supreme Court case concerning the 
balance of the right to know and the need to withhold is New York Times 
Co. v. United States.54  The thrust of the case was an attempt by the 
government to receive injunctive relief against the New York Times and 
the Washington Post in order to prohibit them from continuing to publish 
the contents of the classified and highly secretive Pentagon Papers.55  In a 
per curiam decision, the Court determined that the government failed to 
meet the heavy burden required to justify the imposition of a prior 
restraint against the newspapers.56  However, the nine individual 
opinions that followed indicated a splintered Court regarding the 
Justices’ reasoning, dicta, and policy concerns.57 
                                                 
51 96 CONG. REC. 6082 (1950). 
52 95 CONG. REC. 2774 (1949). 
53 Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1069.  In one of history’s ironic twists, the main 
editors of the New York Times were active members of the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors.  Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 28. 
54 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).  The litigation has come to be 
known as the Pentagon Papers case, named after the Defense Department study detailing 
American involvement in Vietnam.  Id. at 714.  The study, commissioned by Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara, was officially titled “History of U.S. Decision-Making Process 
on Vietnam Policy.”  Id.  A federal district court in New York refused to issue the  
injunction requested by the government to stop the publishing of sections of the study in 
the Times.  United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).  However, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and approved the injunction.  United States v. 
N.Y. Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2nd Cir. 1971). 
55 N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. 713.  Importantly, the Government argued only for an 
injunction, and its brief lacked any mention of the espionage statutes, presumably because 
no section authorizes injunctive, but rather only criminal, relief.  See also Edgar & Schmidt, 
supra note 16, at 931. 
56 Id. at 714. 
57 Id. at 713.  Justice Black and Justice Douglas each wrote a concurring opinion, while 
joining each other.  The same can be said for Justices Stewart and White.  Justice Brennan 
authored a concurring opinion, as did Justice Marshall.  Justice Harlan wrote the principal 
dissent, which was also joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun.  Finally, Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun each wrote a separate dissenting opinion. 
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A brief examination of the differing opinions denotes the fractured 
nature of the Justices’ rationales.58  Justices Black and Douglas indicated 
that they believed the First Amendment is an absolute, in that no 
governmental restraints can be placed on the press’ right to publish any 
and all information.59  While Justice Brennan’s concurrence did not go to 
such an extreme, he did assert that the First Amendment bars the 
judiciary from stopping the publication of material that a newspaper 
already has in its possession.60 
More pertinent to the issue of this Note were the opinions of the 
remaining six Justices.  First, Justice Stewart, while concurring that the 
injunction should not be granted, did concede that Congress has the 
power and ability to pass criminal laws to protect secret government 
information.61  Although he did not specifically name section 798, Justice 
Stewart stated that “Congress has passed such laws, and several of them 
are of very colorable relevance” to the case at hand.62  Moreover, Justice 
White expended a substantial portion of his opinion to further elaborate 
upon possible criminal prosecutions.63  Explicitly referring to section 798 
as a provision of the Criminal Code that would allow prosecutions 
against publishers, Justice White noted that he would not hesitate to 
sustain a conviction if the elements of the statute were met.64 
Justice Marshall, while maintaining that there may have been a 
criminal statute that fit the facts of the Pentagon Papers situation, 
commented that various provisions did in fact criminalize the 
dissemination of certain government secrets.65  Yet, through his 
                                                 
58 See infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text. 
59 N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714-15 (Black, J., concurring); see id. at 720 (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
60 Id. at 725 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
61 Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
62 Id.  Justice Stewart went on to assert that, if the government decided to proceed with 
criminal sanctions under the appropriate statutes, it would be the duty of the judicial 
branch to enforce them if constitutional.  Id. 
63 Id. at 733-40 (White, J., concurring). 
64 Id. at 735.  Justice White stated, “I would have no difficulty in sustaining convictions 
under these sections on facts that would not justify the intervention of equity and the 
imposition of a prior restraint.”  Id. at 737.  Another section that Justice White pointed to for 
possible prosecution in this situation was 18 U.S.C. § 793(e).  Id. at 737-40; cf. 403 U.S. at 745 
(Marshall, J., concurring); infra note 65 (discussing the powers of the legislature to create 
laws that prohibited the disclosures of some classified government secrets). 
65 N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 743-45 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
Congress has on several occasions given extensive consideration to the 
problem of protecting the military and strategic secrets of the United 
States.  This consideration has resulted in the enactment of statutes 
making it a crime to receive, disclose, communicate, withhold, and 
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observations concerning several other similar statutes, Justice Marshall 
made clear that it is the province of the legislature to criminalize certain 
disclosures, and the courts have the ultimate responsibility to enforce 
them.66 
Furthermore, the three dissenters from the per curiam opinion also 
shed additional light on the issue of whether criminal sanctions were 
possible in situations where national defense information is published.  
Indeed, Chief Justice Burger explicitly approved of the notions of Justice 
White’s concurrence regarding the application of criminal punishment.67  
Although the remaining two dissenters, Justices Harlan and Blackmun, 
did not overtly assert that criminal statutes existed which could be 
employed against the publishers, they did not explicitly disapprove of 
this view, as they would have granted the injunction against publishing 
the Pentagon Papers altogether.68 
Heeding the guidance of these Supreme Court Justices, the 
government soon thereafter brought a fifteen-count indictment against 
the New York Times reporters who compiled and published the Pentagon 
Papers, Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo.69  The indictment charged 
                                                                                                             
publish certain documents, photographs, instruments, appliances, and 
information.  The bulk of these statutes is found in chapter 37 of U. S. 
C., Title 18, entitled Espionage and Censorship. 
Id. at 743. 
66 Id. at 743-47.  Justice Marshall also referenced previous attempts ultimately defeated 
by Congress that would have prohibited publishing certain government secrets.  Id. at 746-
47; see also supra notes 23-24 (describing President Wilson’s broad censorship proposal that 
was eventually defeated by Congress).  In 1957, the United States Commission on 
Government Security proposed an ultimately-defeated provision to Congress, stating that 
Congress should “enact legislation making it a crime for any person willfully to disclose 
without proper authorization, for any purpose whatever, information classified ‘secret’ or 
‘top secret,’ knowing, or having reasonable grounds to believe, such information to have 
been so classified.”  N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 747 (quoting the Report of Commission of 
Government Security, 619-20 (1957)). 
67 N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 748, 752 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating “I should add that 
I am in general agreement with much of what Mr. Justice White has expressed with respect 
to penal sanctions concerning communication or retention of documents or information 
relating to the national defense”). 
68 Id. at 753-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Id.  at 759-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
69 Melville B. Nimmer, National Security v. Free Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in the 
Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1974).  Ellsberg, who was a member of the Defense 
Department commission that researched and authored the Pentagon Papers, was in 
possession of the Papers between August 1969 and May 1970.  Id. at 312.  During this time 
period, Ellsberg admittedly took them from his top secret safe and copied them at a 
location ten miles away.  Id. at 313.  Russo also admitted to helping Ellsberg achieve this 
task.  Id. 
Alson: Someone Talked! The Necessity of Prohibitions Against Publishing
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
1292 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
the defendants with a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d)-(e)70 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 641.71  However, all charges were dismissed against Ellsberg and Russo 
when Judge William Matthew Byrne, Jr., granted the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss due to government misconduct.72  As a result of this limited 
victory for Ellsberg and Russo, the merits of the case were never 
resolved, leaving commentators to ponder the hypothetical 
implications.73 
While the Pentagon Papers case only tangentially affects possible 
prosecutions under the COMINT statute, it points toward the possibility 
of the prosecution of journalists for their publication of certain classified 
information.74  Moreover, following the dismissal of the Ellsberg case for 
reasons other than the merits of the case, “[t]he specter of Ellsberg hangs 
over government officials, newsmen, and others who may in the future 
wish to disclose to the public vital governmental documents.”75  In the 
decades since these cases, few cases have considered the issue, but those 
that have are indicative of the judicial trend toward protection of 
national security.76 
D. Tightening the National Security Screws 
Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, as both foreign and 
domestic United States policy was influenced by the Cold War and 
nuclear proliferation, the necessity of government secrecy increased, as 
                                                 
70 See supra notes 21 and 29 for the full text of the provisions. 
71 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006).  This provision criminalizes, among other things, the stealing, 
converting, and embezzling of government documents, which in this case included the 
Pentagon Papers.  Nimmer, supra note 69, at 315.  The application of this statute is outside 
the scope of this Note. 
72 Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 353 F. Supp. 515, 516 n.1 (D.D.C. 1973) (citing United States v. 
Russo, No. 9373-(WMB)-CD (filed Dec. 29, 1971), dismissed (C.D. Cal. May 11, 1973)).  The 
court granted the motion to dismiss due to “the totality of government misconduct, 
including the suppression of evidence, the invasion of the physician-patient relationship, 
the illegal wiretapping, the destruction of relevant documents and disobedience to judicial 
orders.”  Nimmer, supra note 69, at 311.  Judge Byrne implemented this language in his oral 
grounds for dismissal, which coincided with the language of the defendants’ oral motion to 
dismiss.  Id. at 311 n.2. 
73 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 69 (discussing the possible outcome of the Ellsberg and 
Russo prosecution had the case been judged on its merits, concluding that they would have 
been found not guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 641, and that 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d)–(e) would have 
been found unconstitutional due to facial overbreadth). 
74 See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text. 
75 Nimmer, supra note 69, at 312. 
76 See infra Part II.D. 
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both classic spies and leaks to the press became a serious problem.77  
Such media related activity and, in at least one case, subsequent 
prosecution, was evident in United States v. Morison.78  In Morison, the 
government brought charges against Samuel Morison for violating 
sections 793 (d) and (e) of the Espionage Act after he provided classified 
photographs of a Soviet aircraft carrier to a British magazine, which were 
taken by a secret reconnaissance satellite.79  When the District Court of 
Maryland convicted Morison under sections 793(d) and (e), it was the 
first time a court determined that the Espionage Act could be 
successfully applied to the act of providing documents or information to 
a member of the media, as opposed to an agent of a foreign 
government.80 
On appeal, Morison argued that the provisions did not apply to this 
situation, because prosecutions under the Espionage Act had never been 
used against a person in his position.81  However, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals agreed with the government that the literal words of 
the statutes did not prohibit such a conviction.82  Importantly, the court 
expressly stated that simply because prosecutions under a provision are 
infrequent, it does not follow that the statutory language should be 
invalidated.83  As a result, the court affirmed the district court’s 
conviction of a two-year prison term.84 
                                                 
77 See Thomas S. Martin, National Security and the First Amendment: A Change in 
Perspective, 68 A.B.A. J. 680 (1982).  Martin, a deputy assistant attorney general in the Civil 
Division of the Department of Justice during the Carter administration, stated that a large 
portion of disclosures came not from spies but from authors and journalists who made 
previously-classified information public through media outlets.  Id. at 680-81.  This was 
because “[t]hey were idealists convinced that the world would be a better place if 
particular secret information were available to the public.  They were journalists who took 
from Vietnam and Watergate the proposition that disclosure of government secrets is 
inherently a public service and even a primary responsibility of the profession.” Id. at 681. 
78 United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988). 
79 Id. at 1060-61.  Morison, a former civilian analyst at the Naval Intelligence Support 
Center (“NISC”) in Suitland, Maryland, had been employed from 1974 until October 1984.  
Id. at 1060.  Additionally, he worked as a part-time editor of the British magazine Jane’s 
Fighting Ships.  Id.  Due to his dissatisfaction at the NISC and in an attempt to gain a 
promotion with the magazine, Morison passed along three classified photographs of the 
Soviet carrier to the editor-in-chief of Jane’s Fighting Ships, Derek Wood.  Id. at 1060-61. 
80 604 F. Supp. 655 (Md. 1985); see also David H. Topol, United States v. Morison: A 
Threat to the First Amendment Right to Publish National Security Information, 43 S.C. L. REV. 
581, 590 (1992) (arguing that Morison set an alarming precedent by interpreting sections 
793(d) and (e) to allow media-related prosecutions, as opposed to classic spy situations). 
81 Morison, 844 F.2d at 1063. 
82 Id. at 1067. 
83 Id. at 1067. 
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Additionally, a case is currently being litigated that has a bearing on 
the constant balance between national security and press leaks.85  United 
States v. Rosen86 involves the actions of two officials of the American 
Israel Public Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”), a Washington, D.C. lobbyist 
group.87  The AIPAC officials, Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman, were 
accused of receiving classified information from Lawrence Franklin, an 
employee of the Defense Department, and then conspiring to transfer the 
information to an Israeli diplomat and members of the media.88  Rosen 
and Weissman were both charged with violating sections 793(e) and (g), 
while Rosen was additionally charged with violating section 793(d).89 
                                                                                                             
[T]he rarity of prosecution under the statutes does not indicate that the 
statutes were not to be enforced as written.  We think in any event that 
the rarity of the use of the statute as a basis for prosecution is at best 
questionable for nullifying the clear language of the statute, and we 
think the revision of 1950 and its reenactment of section 793(d) 
demonstrate that Congress did not consider such statute meaningless 
or intend that the statute and its prohibitions were to be abandoned. 
Id. 
84 Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 25.  The court also determined that the statutes met other 
constitutional hurdles, such as the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.  Id.  Over a 
decade after his release from prison, Morison received a full pardon in 2001 from President 
Clinton on his last day in office.  Id. at 25 n.5. 
85 Id. at 25. 
86 United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
87 Id.  AIPAC has been described as one of the “most influential lobbying organizations” 
in Washington, one which lobbied on issues relating to American foreign policy in the 
Middle East.  Dan Eggen & Jerry Markon, 2 Senior AIPAC Employees Ousted, WASH. TIMES, 
Apr. 21, 2005, at A08. 
88 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 608-09.  Franklin was a mid-level worker on the Iran desk in 
the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Defense, who held a top secret security 
clearance during the alleged illegal actions.  Id.  Following an alleged conspiracy by 
disclosing information to Rosen and Weissman beginning in late 2002, Franklin began to 
cooperate with the FBI in July of 2004.  Id. at 608-10. 
On October 5, 2005, Franklin pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to 
communicate national defensey information to one not entitled to 
receive it, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d) and (g), and to one count 
of conspiracy to communicate classified information to an agent of a 
foreign government in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 783 and 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
Id. at 608 n.3.  Franklin was sentenced to a prison term of twelve-and-a-half years, which 
will be reviewed following the trial of Rosen and Weissman.  Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 
25-26. 
89 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 610.  Their indictment maintains that they used “their 
contacts within the U.S. government and elsewhere to gather sensitive U.S. government 
information, including classified information relating to national defense, for subsequent 
unlawful communication, delivery, and transmission to persons not entitled to receive it.”  
Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 25.  Rosen’s additional charge was based on his alleged aiding 
and abetting Franklin’s transmission of a fax of classified document.  Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 
at 610. 
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In August of 2006, a district court in Virginia convicted Rosen and 
Weissman of all charges.90  Despite the defendants’ challenges of as-
applied vagueness, facial overbreadth, and transgression of their First 
Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the government, the 
court asserted that the plain language of the provisions applied to 
classified information that had been “leaked” to them.91 
The court discounted the defendants’ assertion that because section 
793(e) had never been applied to prosecute persons in their situation, it 
thus violated the fair warning element of the vagueness doctrine.92  
Rosen and Weissman, as non-government persons, argued that the intent 
of the statute was not to punish disseminators of already leaked 
information, thus the prosecution was “novel and unprecedented.”93  
However, the court decided that the plain language of the statute 
prevailed under these circumstances, regardless of the fact that the 
defendants were non-government personnel.94 
The AIPAC case is instructive because it highlights the issue of 
national security secrecy.  First, Rosen and Weissman were not 
government employees, and thus Rosen stands, at least in part, for the 
proposition that the Espionage Act can be successfully applied to 
persons to whom information is leaked in the first place.95  Moreover, the 
district court determined that the language of the statutes was 
sufficiently clear to pass constitutional scrutiny and was not overbroad.96  
                                                 
90 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 645. 
91 Id. at 628. 
92 Id. at 627-28. 
93 Id.  The court emphasized that “labeling an event a ‘leak’ does not remove the event 
from the statute’s scope.  At best, the term ‘leak’ is a euphemism used to imply or suggest 
to a careless reader that the transmission of the information was somehow authorized. . . .  
[D]efendants frequent use of ‘leak’ as a characterization of what occurred is unavailing.”  
Id. at 628-29. 
94 Id. at 628.  The court reasoned that “[i]n amending the statute in 1950, Congress made 
it quite clear that the statute was intended to apply to the transmission of national defense 
information by non-government employees by adding subsection (e).”  Id. at 628 n.38. 
95 Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 26.  There was not a violation of due process, as the 
defendants had argued, claiming that this prosecution was a “novel construction of a 
criminal statute . . . that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly 
disclosed to be within its scope.”  Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 627.  The defendants also 
asserted that they did not have fair warning that the statute applied to them, but the 
Morison decision had also considered the same argument and rejected it there as well.  Id. at 
628; see also United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1067 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting United 
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997)). 
96 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 643; but see District Court Holds That Recipients of Government 
Leaks Who Disclose Information “Related to the National Defense” May Be Prosecuted Under the 
Espionage Act, 120 HARV. L. REV. 821, 823-24 (2007) (asserting that the Rosen decision was 
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Finally, the indictment and subsequent conviction of Rosen and 
Weissman indicate that it is illegal both to gain possession of classified 
information and subsequently forward it to others, including a “member 
of the media.”97  However, what if Rosen and Weissman, as opposed to 
passing along the information secretly, had instead written an article and 
published it on the front page of a major national newspaper? 
E. The New York Times and its Disclosures 
Within the past several years, the New York Times has published 
prominent articles that have disclosed two classified anti-terrorist 
programs that were illegally leaked to it from anonymous sources inside 
the United States’ government.98  First, on December 16, 2005, the New 
York Times published a front-page article under the headline “Bush Lets 
U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts.”99  The article, written by journalists 
James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, described the existence of a highly 
classified terrorist surveillance program conducted by the National 
Security Agency (“NSA”) and the manner in which it operated.100  
Second, Lichtblau and Risen authored another article, published in the 
New York Times on June 23, 2006, titled “Bank Data Sifted in Secret by 
U.S. to Block Terror,” which disclosed the manner in which the 
government tracks the finances of suspected terrorists.101 
                                                                                                             
incorrect, as the Espionage Act is unconstitutionally vague as applied to situations where 
the First Amendment is implicated); see also Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16 and 
accompanying text. 
97 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 626 (asserting that even if such a transmission of information 
relating to the national defense to the media was in his mind “an act of patriotism,” he 
could still be convicted of willfully disclosing the information); see also Schoenfeld, supra 
note 39, at 26. 
98 See infra notes 99, 101. 
99 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.  The article was a precursor to Risen’s impending publication of a book 
detailing at length, among other intelligence matters, the NSA program that was the subject 
of the Times’ article.  See generally JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR (2006). 
100 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 99. 
101 Eric Lichblau & James Risen, Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A1.  Barclay Walsh also contributed to the article.  Id.  Similar 
articles were published the same day in two other major American newspapers, the Los 
Angeles Times and the Wall Street Journal. See Josh Meyer & Greg Miller, Secret U.S. Program 
Tracks Global Bank Transfers, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A1; Glenn R. Simpson, Treasury 
Tracks Financial Data in Search Effort, WALL ST. JOURNAL, June 23, 2006, at A1; Editorial, Fit 
and Unfit to Print, WALL ST. JOURNAL, June 30, 2006, available at http://www. 
opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110008585 (explaining that because 
government officials had not told the Wall Street Journal that it had urged the New York 
Times not to publish the story, the Journal went forth with publication). 
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Relying on numerous anonymous government officials, the 
December 2005 article disclosed that the NSA program, authorized by a 
2002 presidential order, allowed the NSA to monitor international 
telephone and e-mail communications between people inside the 
country and suspected terrorist-related persons outside the United 
States.102  The program allowed the NSA to monitor such 
communications without applying for warrants from the Foreign 
Intelligence Security Act (“FISA”) courts, the 1978 legislation that had 
previously authorized such surveillance.103  The government has argued 
that Congress empowered the President to create the program when it 
enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) shortly 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.104  The NSA program has 
been praised by the administration and its supporters as one of the most 
crucial anti-terrorism weapons employed by the United States since the 
                                                 
102 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 99, at A1 (“[n]early a dozen current and former officials, 
who were granted anonymity because of the classified nature of the program, discussed it 
with reporters for The New York Times because of their concerns about the operation’s 
legality and oversight”).  At least one of the anonymous sources has been reported as 
Russell Tice, a former longtime employee of the NSA.  Brian Ross, NSA Whistleblower 
Alleges Illegal Spying (Jan. 10, 2006), available at http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/ 
Investigation/story?id=1491889. 
103 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 99.  The constitutionality of the program has been 
greatly questioned, especially by politicians, civil libertarians, and interest groups.  
Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 23; see, e.g., Washington in Brief (Feb. 14, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/13/AR200602130200
6.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2006) (discussing the fact that the American Bar Association had 
denounced the program as unconstitutional); see also CNN, Bush: Secret Wiretaps Have 
Disrupted Potential Attacks (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/12/19/ 
nsa/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2006) (“‘This administration is playing fast and loose 
with the law in national security.  The issue here is whether the president of the United 
States is putting himself above the law, and I believe he has done so.’”) (quoting Wisconsin 
Democratic Senator Russ Feingold).  Following the article’s publishing, President Bush 
declared that he did instruct the NSA to “intercept the international communications of 
people with known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations[,]” but that before 
such surveillance, “the government must have information that establishes a clear link to 
these terrorist networks.”  The White House, President’s Radio Address, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051217.html (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2006). 
104 The AUMF states: 
[t]hat the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. 
Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001). 
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attacks of September 11th to disrupt and thwart future plots.105  Several 
government officials have publicly proclaimed that the program was a 
central tool in fighting terror.106  The importance of the secrecy of the 
program was highlighted by the fact that Bush administration officials 
pleaded with the Times not to publish the details of the classified 
program.107 
In August of 2006, a federal district court held the program 
unconstitutional as a violation of the First and Fourth Amendments, in 
addition to the separation of powers doctrine.108  On appeal, however, on 
                                                 
105 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 99, at A1.  Although the extent to which the NSA 
program has been successful is still unknown, it has been credited with discovering the 
plot of terrorist Iyman Faris, the American citizen who pled guilty in 2003 to plotting to 
topple the Brooklyn Bridge with blowtorches.  Id.  Additionally, an al Qaeda plan to 
employ fertilizer bomb attacks on British bars and train stations was uncovered in 2004 
partly from information gathered through the NSA program.  Id.; see also, e.g., Pierre 
Thomas, Mary Walsh & Jason Ryan, Officials Search for Terrorist Next Door (Sept. 8, 2003), 
available at http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=129090&page. 
106 Gabriel Schoenfeld, Statement Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (June 6, 
2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/060606schoenfeld. 
pdf#search=%22edgar%20schmidt%20bent%20tortured%20sanction%22.  The National 
Intelligence Director, John Negroponte, has described the NSA program as “crucial for 
protecting the nation against its most menacing threat.”  Id.  “FBI director Robert Mueller 
has [stated that the program] has ‘been valuable in identifying would-be terrorists in the 
United States.’”  Id.  Former director of the NSA and current Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, General Michael Hayden, asserted that it was his “professional 
judgment that if we had had this program in place [before 9/11], we would have identified 
some of the al-Qaeda operatives in the United States.”  Id.  Porter Goss, former Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency and predecessor of General Hayden, referred to the 
disclosure of the NSA program as having caused “very severe” damage to United States’ 
intelligence collection capabilities.  Id.  Jane Harman, the ranking Democratic member of 
the House Intelligence Committee, maintained “that the disclosure of the NSA program 
‘damaged critical intelligence capabilities.’”  Id. 
107 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 99, at A1.  The Times decided to delay publication for 
over a year after it first met with administration officials to conduct more investigation.  Id.; 
see also Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 24. 
108 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 
(E.D. Mich. 2006).  The court found that because the wiretaps were not implemented in 
accordance with FISA, the “program . . . [is] obviously in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 775.  Additionally, the court reasoned that because of the nature of the 
chilling effect the wiretaps had on the speech of the plaintiffs, their First Amendment rights 
were also violated.  Id. at 776.  Finally, the court asserted that because the Congress enacted 
FISA, and the President violated its provisions, the Separation of Powers doctrine was 
infringed.  Id. at 779; see also Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. & Robert B. Shaw, Down to the Wire: 
Assessing the Constitutionally of the National Security Agency’s Warrantless Wiretapping 
Program: Exit the Rule of Law, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 429 (2006) (claiming that the 
program cannot withstand legitimate constitutional scrutiny).  The ruling was 
subsequently appealed by the government to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
granted the government’s request to delay the application of the injunction.  Am. Civil 
Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 467 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006). 
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July 6, 2007, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district 
court’s order and dismissed the action because the plaintiffs lacked 
standing for their claims.109  The court held that the plaintiffs, which 
included lawyers, academics, and journalists who often had contact with 
people who they believed were targets of the NSA program, failed to 
meet the standing requirement under any of their six claims.110 
However, after the district court’s determination of the program’s 
illegality, but before the Sixth Circuit reversed that decision, in January 
of 2007, the Bush administration decided not to reauthorize the NSA 
program.111  Attorney General Alberto Gonzales sent a letter to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee in which he maintained that all government 
electronic surveillance will be first endorsed by the FISA courts.112  While 
Gonzales claimed that court orders by a judge of the FISA court will 
allow for sufficiently quick responses to administration requests for 
warrants, some in the media questioned why the Bush administration 
seemingly altered its position on the issue.113 
Nearly six months after the NSA disclosure, the Times once again 
published an article describing another top secret program, commonly 
known as the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (“TFTP”).114  A 
                                                 
109 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 687-88 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(the majority was written by Circuit Judge Alice M. Batchelder, with a concurring opinion 
by Judge Julia Smith Gibbons, and Circuit Judge Ronald Lee Gilman dissenting). 
110 Id. at 659-83.  The claims asserted by the plaintiffs included a First Amendment free 
speech challenge, a Fourth Amendment privacy challenge, a separation of powers 
challenge, a review under the Administrative Procedure Act, a challenge under Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, and a challenge under FISA.  Id. 
111 Prepared Opening Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Justice 
Department Oversight Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Jan. 18, 2007). 
112 Id.  In particular, Gonzales asserted that “surveillance into or out of the United States 
where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or 
agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization [will be] subject to the approval of 
the FISA Court.”  Id. 
113 See, e.g., Rob Hendin, Why Warrantless Wiretapping Is No More (Jan. 19, 2007), available 
at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/01/19/politics/main2376652.shtml; Andrew 
C. McCarthy, The ACLU Loses in Court, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, July 23, 2007, at 17-18 
(explaining that because FISA requires a probable cause standard to be met before 
surveillance of a foreign person may occur, and the Fourth Amendment authorizes 
searches when the much less stringent standard of reasonableness is met, FISA does not 
allow surveillance on everyone the nation needs to monitor during this war); David B. 
Rivkin & Lee A. Casey, Surveillance Showdown (Sept. 30, 2007), available at 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/forms/printThis.html?id=110010670 (questioning 
whether “any sane country [would] purposefully limit its ability to spy on enemy 
communications in time of war,” concluding that “for the first time in history, the U.S. is 
asked to collect less intelligence about the enemy while prosecuting a war.”) 
114 Lichblau & Risen, supra note 101. 
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Treasury Department program operated in conjunction with the CIA, the 
TFTP monitors a network of worldwide financial institutions without the 
knowledge of many banks or their customers.115 
In contrast to the NSA program, there have been few concrete 
objections to the TFTP claiming that it is an unconstitutional program, 
other than a supposed lack of oversight.116  This is because SWIFT is 
required to give this information to nations under a 1977 statute, the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), when 
subpoenaed by governments pursuant to a Presidential declaration of 
national emergency.117 
Accordingly, there has been a large amount of critical response to the 
decision by the Times to publish both the Risen and Lichtblau articles.118  
Foremost, President Bush labeled the disclosure of the NSA program as a 
“shameful act.”119  Moreover, the President has indicated his concern 
that the disclosures will cause targets of the program to change their 
                                                 
115 Meyer & Miller, supra note 101, at 1.  The major conglomeration that allowed the U.S. 
to monitor their records is formally known as the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication, or SWIFT.  Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 101, at A1.  SWIFT 
operates when banks from all around the globe issue international, often overseas, 
completed monetary transfers, but does not provide information regarding individual bank 
account information.  Stuart Levey, Under Secretary Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, 
Testimony Before the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (July 
11, 2006), at 1, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp05.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).  
Additionally, SWIFT contains no information about most normal domestic transactions in 
the United States, such as ATM withdrawals, checks, or deposits.  Id. at 2. 
116 Meyer & Miller, supra note 101, at 2.  “Critics complain that these efforts are not 
subject to independent governmental reviews designed to prevent abuse, and charge that 
they collide with privacy and consumer protection laws in the United States.”  Id. 
117 Levey, supra note 115, at 2.  In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
President Bush soon thereafter issued Executive Order 13224, which is the basis for the 
required subpoenas.  Id.  The Order is renewed yearly as the terrorist threat has continued.  
Id. 
118 See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text. 
119 NBC News and News Services, Bush Says Leaking Spy Program a ‘Shameful Act’ (Dec. 
20, 2005), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10530417/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).  Bush 
promised to continue to employ the NSA program “for so long as the nation faces the 
continuing threat of an enemy that wants to kill American citizens.”  Id.  The American 
Society of Newspapers Editors issued a news release that supported the actions of the 
Times, stating in part that “[t]he administration of President George W. Bush and some 
members of Congress are threatening America’s bedrock values of free speech and free 
press with their attempts to demonize newspapers for fulfilling their constitutional roles in 
our democratic society.”  American Society of Newspapers Editors, ASNE Criticizes 
President, Lawmakers for Attacks on Newspapers (June 30, 2006), http://www.asne.org/ 
index.cfm?ID=6346 (last visited Jan. 11, 2006). 
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tactics.120  In the weeks following the disclosure of the NSA program, the 
Justice Department began an investigation into the source of the leaked 
national security information.121 
In an even more public confrontation, Treasury Secretary John W. 
Snow responded to the TFTP program disclosure by writing a letter to 
the editor to the New York Times, demonstrating the government’s anger 
at its decision to publish the article.122  Furthermore, at least one 
prominent member of the House of Representatives, then-Chairman of 
the House Homeland Security Committee Peter R. King, publicly 
advocated the government to seek criminal charges against “the New 
York Times—the reporters, the editors, and the publisher.”123  Days after 
the TFTP article, the House of Representatives formally voted to 
condemn the decision to disclose the program.124 
While the decision by the Times to publish the existence and 
operation of the programs caused a firestorm of criticism of both the 
                                                 
120 Peter Baker & Charles Babington, Bush Addresses Uproar over Spying (Dec. 20, 2005), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/19/ 
AR2005121900211_pf.html (quoting President Bush, “[t]he fact that we’re discussing this 
program is helping the enemy”). 
121 Toni Locy, Justice Dept. Opens Domestic Spying Probe (Dec. 30, 2005), available at 
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8EQLIAGB&show_article=1.  In August of 
2007, the FBI searched the home of former Justice Department lawyer Thomas Tamm, 
taking his computer, two laptops, and some personal files; however, investigation 
continues and no charges have been brought against Mr. Tamm or any other person 
regarding the leak.  Associated Press, Report: FBI Searches Home of Attorney in Warrantless 
Wiretap Program Case (August 5, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,292184,00. 
html (last visited Sept. 9, 2007). 
122 John W. Snow, Bank Data Report: Treasury Dept.’s View, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2006, at 
A24.  Secretary Snow asserted that the program was undermined by the disclosure, as 
terrorists were notified about America’s method of tracking their financial activities.  Id.  
Moreover, Secretary Snow assailed the Times’ justification for publishing the article that the 
terrorists knew their money trails were being monitored by stating “[t]he fact that your 
editors believe themselves to be qualified to assess how terrorists are moving money 
betrays a breathtaking arrogance and a deep misunderstanding of this program and how it 
works.”  Id. 
123 Devlin Barrett, Lawmaker Wants Times Prosecuted (June 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/25/AR2006062500 
675.html. 
124 Rick Klein, House Votes to Condemn Media Over Terror Story (June 30, 2006), available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/06/30/house_votes_to_condemn_
media_over_terror_story/?page=1.  The nonbinding “Sense of the Congress” resolution 
states that the disclosure “may have placed the lives of Americans in danger” and that 
Congress “expects the cooperation of all news media organizations” in ensuring the 
secrecy of classified programs.  Id.  The resolution passed by a vote of 227-183, with 
seventeen Democrats joining almost all House Republicans in condemning the publication.  
Id. 
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government and the media, the Times may also have crossed a legal 
line.125  As the aforementioned statutes and case law suggest, limits exist 
regarding the communication and publication of classified 
information.126  Therefore, the next Part of this Note further explores 
whether the relevant law will allow such a prosecution of the Times for 
its publication of either the TFTP or NSA programs.127 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this Part is to demonstrate that while the Espionage 
Act may be ambiguous, the COMINT statute is straightforward, and 
strong policy rationales exist for enforcement of the latter’s provisions.128  
First, Part III.A discusses the unambiguous nature of the COMINT 
statute, especially in comparison to other provisions of the Espionage 
Act.129  Next, Part III.B analyzes the manner in which the COMINT 
statute protects sensitive national security information concerning 
intelligence, and also discusses the strong public policy for limiting the 
disclosure of confidential national security information.130  Finally, Part 
III.C examines whether any of the provisions can or should apply to the 
disclosure of the classified TFTP or NSA programs by the New York 
Times.131 
A. Espionage Act vs. COMINT Statute 
In order to analyze the crucial differences between the Espionage Act 
and the COMINT statute, the actual wording of the provisions, 
legislative histories, and historical contexts must be examined.132  By 
juxtaposing the words of the statutes, it is clear that as compared to the 
earlier enacted provisions, the COMINT statute is indeed “a model of 
precise draftsmanship.”133  The earlier Espionage Act included three 
major areas where ambiguity exists concerning the provisions’ plain 
meaning.134  First, there is uncertainty whether the publishing of 
information is the kind of communication that is necessary to satisfy an 
                                                 
125 See infra Part III.C. 
126 See supra Part II.A-D. 
127 See infra Part III. 
128 See infra Parts III.A-C. 
129 See infra Part III.A. 
130 See infra Part III.B. 
131 See infra Part III.C. 
132 See infra Parts II.A-B. 
133 Edgar and Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1065; see also supra notes 47-50 and accompanying 
text. 
134 Edgar and Schmidt, supra note 16, at 938. 
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element of the statutes.135  Additionally, the mens rea requirement that 
the information be willfully communicated with intent to injure the 
United States or to help another nation causes uncertainty, for it is a very 
subjective and malleable standard.136  Finally, ambiguity exists perhaps 
to the greatest extent regarding the type of information that is protected 
by the statute, which includes the inherently ambiguous standard of 
“information ‘relating to the national defense.’”137 
In comparison, the COMINT statute contains straightforward 
language and definitions that allow very little room for 
misinterpretation.138  For example, the provision explicitly includes the 
term “publishes” as a prohibition, and even sets it off by commas to 
possibly emphasize it.139  Moreover, following the prohibitions of the 
COMINT statute, the drafters included precise definitions of the words 
“classified information,” “communication intelligence,” and 
“unauthorized person.”140  Because there is no statutory element that the 
United States be at war, it is clear that the section prohibits all such 
disclosures, regardless of the intricacies of modern day declarations of 
war.141 
Additionally, the legislative histories and historical contexts of the 
statutes shed light on their purposes.142  Congress had debated and 
unequivocally refused to criminalize the publishing of all types of 
defense information when it passed the precursors to the current 
Espionage Act in 1917.143  However, the fact that Congress subsequently 
passed the COMINT statute after World War II and the Chicago Tribune’s 
                                                 
135 Id. (discussing the Espionage Act and its corresponding legislative history that causes 
confusion, since the plain language of sections 793(c)–(e) seems to criminalize almost any 
acquisition by journalists of information relating to the national defense; however, 
Congress “did not understand the provisions to have that effect, and they have never been 
so employed”). 
136 Id. at 1040 (determining that Congress did not fully appreciate the implications the 
Espionage Act would have upon activities that it had not deliberately wanted to 
criminalize). 
137 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (describing how a plain reading of the statute 
could prohibit the publishing of any defense related information). 
138 See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 938. 
139 See supra note 37 for the full text of the provision. 
140 Id.  The subsection also defines “code,” “cipher,” “cryptographic system,” and 
“foreign government.”  Id.  Such helpful definitions are lacking from the other main 
provisions of the Espionage Act.  18 U.S.C. §§ 793–794 (2000). 
141 See supra note 50 and accompanying text; see also Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 
1065. 
142 See supra Parts II.A-B. 
143 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (describing the defeat of President 
Wilson’s press censorship proposal). 
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disclosure of cryptographic information after the Battle of Midway gives 
overwhelming credence to the idea that Congress clearly meant to 
prohibit the publication of communications intelligence.144  The 
protection of this nation’s communications intelligence secrets were 
essential then, and the significance of their protection has only increased 
in the decades that have followed.145 
B. It’s Secret for a Reason 
When the Espionage Act was first enacted, Congress had national 
security on its mind, because World War I had just ended.146  Congress 
was again concerned with national security when it passed the COMINT 
statute soon after World War II.147  Traditionally, the need to keep 
information secret has been the greatest in wartime, when there are 
troop, ship, and munitions movements, individual battle and long-term 
theater strategies are precious, and the appearance of unity among allies 
is essential.148  Even at the outset of the Cold War, the Espionage Act was 
successfully applied, as it could be utilized proficiently against the 
classic spies who fit the common definitions of espionage and treason.149 
However, history has shown in numerous, and seemingly constant, 
instances that declarations of war are not the only times when lives are 
lost and property is destroyed.  For example, during the Cold War, the 
United States and the Soviet Union never officially declared war upon 
one another.150  Yet, the nations indirectly fought various contests 
                                                 
144 See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text; see also Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 25 
(explaining the way in which the Chicago Tribune’s publication of codebreaking secrets 
following during World War II eventually led to the enactment of the COMINT statute). 
145 See infra Part III.B. 
146 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
147 See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.  The legislative histories of the statutes 
also indicate as much.  Id. 
148 E.E.B. & K.E.M., Plugging the Leak: The Case for a Legislative Resolution of the Conflict 
Between the Demands of Secrecy and the Need for an Open Government, 71 VA. L. REV. 801, 824 
(1985).  “[T]he maintenance of an effective national defense require[s] both confidentiality 
and secrecy. . . . In the area of basic national defense the frequent need for absolute secrecy 
is, of course, self-evident.”  N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) 
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
149 Martin, supra note 77, at 680.  Perhaps the most unforgettable application of the 
Espionage Act occurred during the 1950s trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg following their 
furnishing of atomic bomb secrets to the Soviet Union.  Id. 
150 E.E.B. & K.E.M., supra note 148, at 824.  Proxy wars occurred in Korea, Vietnam, 
Angola, and Central America.  Id.  Certainly, countless other surrogate battles were fought 
in other places, not only with lives, but with materials and financial assistance.  Id. 
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around the world, where thousands of lives were lost and collateral 
destruction occurred.151 
In these types of continuous struggles, interests and information 
beyond that pertaining to military operations must be kept from 
unintended nations and entities.  Obviously important are defense 
installations and features of weapon systems.152  Also, a nation’s prewar 
contingency plans have not nearly the same value if enemies have such 
strategies, for the latter can neutralize any advantages of the plans by 
preparing countermeasures.153  Additionally, certain nonmilitary 
technologies must also be protected during both peace and war, because 
advances in research and development correspond directly to military 
strength and battlefield success.154 
Perhaps the most important secrecy interest is communications 
intelligence, because it deals with intelligence methods, sources, and 
operations.155  This type of intelligence is crucial because its objective is 
to obtain information about foreign nations and entities, including 
military capacities, internal political atmosphere, and diplomatic 
options.156  Accordingly, information gained via communications 
intelligence has the objectives of both guaranteeing efficient national 
defense and also maintaining an effective foreign policy.157 
Protecting the means by which such information is gathered can be 
just as critical as the actual information that is collected.  Keeping one’s 
own nation’s communications intelligence methods secret ensures that 
other nations or entities do not take substantive steps to stop the flow of 
its information.158  Moreover, when an intelligence operation is ongoing, 
it is very susceptible to failure if it is disclosed, because of the obvious 
                                                 
151 Id. 
152 Id.  The most evident among these include nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weaponry. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 825. 
155 Id.; see also supra note 39 (discussing a formal definition of COMINT).  As compared to 
other types of strict intelligence, such as electronic intelligence and foreign instrumental 
signals intelligence, “COMINT is widely regarded as both the most prevalent and the most 
valuable intelligence.”  J. Terrence Stender, Too Many Secrets: Challenges to the Control of 
Strong Crypto and the National Security Perspective, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 287, n.220 
(1998). 
156 E.E.B. & K.E.M., supra note 148, at 825. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
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fact that the entity that is the object of the operation will almost certainly 
take countermeasures to block the flow of the targeted information.159 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it has become 
brutally clear just how magnified both the accumulation of intelligence 
about terrorist groups by means of communication intelligence has 
become, and also the importance of preventing those groups from 
becoming aware of the information-gathering techniques employed 
against them.  As the enemies of the United States increasingly become 
groups that are not officially recognized nation-states, it is more difficult 
to identify the targets of intelligence, and thus more problematic to learn, 
among other things, of their military capabilities, possible future strikes, 
styles of recruitment, and comforting abettors.160  Additionally, 
intelligence is clearly an essential way to enable the United States and its 
allies to find, pursue, and apprehend terrorists.161  Furthermore, in 
contrast to the wars of previous generations, the war on terror has more 
at stake, for a failure in our intelligence of the enemy could lead to a new 
Pearl Harbor or September 11th calamity, but with the use of weapons of 
mass destruction in the place of dive bombers or hijacked airliners.162 
It would be naïve to think that when terrorist organizations learn of 
the intelligence methods that the United States or its allies use, they 
                                                 
159 Id.  The Supreme Court has tended to understand as much.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (“[t]he President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the  
Nation’s organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not 
and ought not to be published to the world”) (quoting C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. 
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (“[t]he 
Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information 
important to our  national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the 
effective operation of our foreign intelligence service”). 
160 Today’s Realities in the War on Terror, National Security Council Press Release, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/sectionII.html#challenges (last visited Feb. 
13, 2008) (describing as one of the challenges of the War on Terror that “[t]errorist networks 
today are more dispersed and less centralized.  They are more reliant on smaller cells 
inspired by a common ideology and less directed by a central command structure[.]”  
Additionally, terrorists’ “[i]ncreasingly sophisticated use of the Internet and media has 
enabled our terrorist enemies to communicate, recruit, train, rally support, proselytize, and 
spread their propaganda without risking personal contact”). 
161 Schoenfeld, supra note 106, at 4; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT 139 
(2006) (explaining the high value of indirect intelligence in the fight against terrorism, 
hypothecizing examples of “an imam who, though not himself involved in terrorism, was 
preaching holy war . . .family members of a terrorist, who might have information about 
his whereabouts . . . sales invoices for materials that could be used to create weapons of 
mass destruction, or of books and articles that expressed admiration for suicide bombers”). 
162 Schoenfeld, supra note 106, at 4.  Also, the fact that our society is so open leaves us 
“uniquely vulnerable.”  Id. 
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would not take countermeasures, just as a traditional nation would do.163  
In fact, terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda rely on information from 
media sources to a substantial extent.164  An al Qaeda training manual, 
along with details about how to make bombs, take hostages, assassinate 
leaders, and withstand interrogation, also instructs how to obtain critical 
information about the societies that its members target: 
Using . . . public source[s] openly and without resorting 
to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80% of 
information about the enemy.  The percentage varies 
depending on the government’s policy on freedom of 
the press and publication.  It is possible to gather 
information through newspapers, magazines, books, 
periodicals, official publications, and enemy 
broadcasts.165 
The NSA program and the TFTP operation were two of the most 
important tools that the United States government used to gain crucial 
intelligence about al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.166  Utilized 
when international communications were discovered between a 
suspected terrorist and a person inside America, the information 
gathered was surely numerous and invaluable; Risen and Lichtblau’s 
December 2005 article even pointed out that information collected by the 
program was used to apprehend terrorist Iyman Faris.167  Similarly, the 
TFTP was especially helpful in curtailing the flow of funds to terrorist 
organizations.168  Through the program, the government was able to 
                                                 
163 Rick Brundrett, Gonzales Talks Tough Against Terrorists, THE STATE, Jan. 12, 2007 
(reporting that Attorney General Gonzales told his audience of U.S. Attorneys that “more 
needs to be done because terrorists ‘change tactics in response to what we do’”). 
164 Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 233, 234 (2005) (discussing the impact that the combination of the nature of technology 
and the freedom of expression in America and Great Britain is having on the ability of 
terrorists to obtain and disseminate critical information). 
165 Id. at 234-35 (quoting an al Qaeda training manual salvaged from a safe house in 
Manchester, England).  The manual goes on to assert that much other information can be 
gained from ordinary media, such as photographs of government personnel, information 
concerning economic vulnerabilities, access to secure buildings, location of water sources, 
observations of response times, and even prophylactic measures utilized by first 
responders.  Id. at 235. 
166 See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (describing the importance of the NSA 
program); see also supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (asserting the necessity for the 
TFTP program). 
167 See supra note 105 (explaining the terrorist plot of Faris). 
168 Levey, supra note 115, at 1.  “‘[F]ollowing the money’ is one of the most valuable 
sources of information that we have to identify and locate the networks of terrorists and 
their supporters.”  Id. 
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deter future donors by blocking the operations of a bogus charity or 
company, and also by arresting donors.169  Additionally, the government 
followed the money trail to identify terrorist networks and their 
supporters and operatives.170  Again, the details of successes stemming 
from the program remain top secret, but both Secretary Snow and 
Secretary Levey have each publicly hailed the program as, at least when 
functioning covertly, a highly effective tool.171 
However, New York Times executive editor Bill Keller defended the 
publication of both articles.172  Generally, he has asserted the obvious, yet 
powerful, point that the freedom of the press is central to the First 
Amendment and that the media holds a unique role as watchdog over 
government activities.173  More specifically, Keller has maintained that 
the terrorists, before the disclosure, could not have been so naïve as to 
believe that their international communications were not being traced.174  
He utilized this same argument regarding the decision to disclose the 
                                                 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Snow, supra note 122, at A24 (calling the program “a robust and classified effort to 
map terrorist networks . . . [I] sought to impress upon him [Mr. Keller] the great value the 
program had in defeating terrorism”).  See also Levey, supra note 115, at 3-4: 
I have received the written output from this program as part of my 
daily intelligence briefing.  For two years, I have been reviewing that 
output every morning.  I cannot remember a day when that briefing 
did not include at least one terrorism lead from this program.  Despite 
attempts at secrecy, terrorist facilitators have continued to use the 
international banking system to send money to one another, even after 
September 11th.  This disclosure compromised one of our most 
valuable programs and will only make our efforts to track terrorist 
financing—and to prevent terrorist attacks – harder.  Tracking terrorist 
money trails is difficult enough without having our sources and 
methods reported on the front page of newspapers. 
Id. at 3-4. 
172 See, e.g., Bill Keller, Letter from Bill Keller on The Times’s Banking Records Report, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 25, 2006; Transcript, The Situation Room, Interview With Bill Keller; Bomb Threat 
Forces Closure of Major American Port, CNN.COM, June 26, 2006, http://transcripts.cnn.com/ 
TRANSCRIPTS/0606/26/sitroom.03.html (last visited Feb 14, 2008). 
173 See generally Keller, supra note 172. 
174 Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 31.  However, there are examples where terrorists have 
continued to be seemingly naive.  As previously mentioned, the NSA program has 
produced results since September 11th, including the discovery ofinternational 
communications between terror suspects and Iyman Faris.  See supra note 105.  It also 
uncovered another al Qaeda plan to bomb British pubs and train stations in 2004 partly 
from information obtained via the NSA program.  See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 99, at 
A1.  These examples were even included in the story the Times’ published, thus it seems 
erroneous for the executive editor to later claim that the terrorists must be too intelligent to 
communicate via international communications.  Schoenfeld, supra note 39, at 31. 
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TFTP program.175  However, regardless of the strength of the policy 
arguments offered by each viewpoint, pertinent statutes and case law 
must be examined to determine whether the New York Times can be 
prosecuted for their disclosure of the classified programs.176 
C. The Possibilities of Prosecution 
Relatively recent case law over the past several decades has 
suggested that a prosecution under a statute such as this would not be 
unfathomable.177  At least four Justices asserted in the Pentagon Papers 
case that prosecutions against reporters and publishers could be 
permitted.178  However, when such was attempted against reporters 
Ellsberg and Russo, it was not judged on its merits.179  Furthermore, in 
United States v. Morison,180 the court found that even the ambiguous 
Espionage Act could be applied to a media-related situation, as opposed 
to the classic case of turning over classified information to an agent of a 
foreign government.181  Further indicating that the courts are willing to 
protect national security secrets, AIPAC officials are currently being 
prosecuted for obtaining classified information and conspiring to pass it 
along to other diplomats and the media.182  Again, the conduct of 
persons who are involved in their professional activity as lobbyists and 
who are not government employees who pass protected information to 
others, is, in certain respects, very similar to the conduct of the New York 
Times.183 
Among the provisions of the Espionage Act that may allow a 
prosecution, the logical place to begin is section 793(e), which prohibits 
one who has “unauthorized possession of . . . information relating to the 
national defense” which could be “used to the injury of the United 
                                                 
175 See generally Keller, supra note 172. 
176 See infra Part III.C. 
177 See supra Parts II.C, II.D. 
178 See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 
403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
179 See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (describing the events surrounding the 
attempted prosecution of Ellsberg and Russo); see also United States v. Russo, No. 9373-
(WMB)-CD (filed Dec. 29, 1971), dismissed (C.D. Cal. May 11, 1973). 
180 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988). 
181 See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Morison case and its 
implications on the application of the Espionage Act). 
182 United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006); see also supra notes 85-97 
and accompanying text (explaining the AIPAC case and its repercussions on national 
security situations). 
183 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (examining the similarities between 
Rosen and Weissman and the disclosures of the New York Times). 
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States” from “willfully communicat[ing] . . . the same to any person not 
entitled to receive it . . . .”184  Although many of the terms used in the 
statute are inherently vague, if the statute is given a broad 
understanding, the disclosures by the New York Times seem to fit under 
the plain meaning of the statute.185  Because both programs were illegally 
leaked to Risen and Lichtblau, their possession was unauthorized, and 
they willfully communicated details of the classified information when 
the stories were published.186  Finally, terrorists who read the articles are 
not persons entitled to receive the information, thus its disclosure could 
have caused injury to the United States, and the publication of the stories 
on the front page of a major national newspaper was a communication of 
the information. 
Bluntly stated, however, section 793(e) has never been applied as the 
plain meaning suggests that it could be.187  The legislative history of the 
Espionage Act as a whole gives the most compelling reasons for this.188  
In 1917, Congress explicitly refused to enact a provision that would have 
prohibited publications of national defense information, and after a 
heated debate, instead ratified the ambiguous language that largely 
survived until today.189  When amended in 1950, Congress then passed 
the narrow COMINT statute, again inferentially refusing to enact a broad 
press censorship provision.190  As a result, it should be concluded that 
the Espionage Act could not be utilized to successfully prosecute Risen, 
Lichtblau, Keller, or the publisher of the New York Times. 
The analysis, of course, cannot stop there, for the applicability of the 
COMINT statute is another possibility for prosecution.  After examining 
the plain meaning of the words in the statute that applies to, “[w]hoever 
                                                 
184 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2000); see supra note 29 for entire text of the statute. 
185 See supra Part III.A (discussing the ambiguous nature of the provision). 
186 However, the criminal element “willfully” has been called “chameleon-like,” where 
its meaning seems to change depending on the context of its application.  See Sharon L. 
Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness:  An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE 
L.J. 341, 380 n.155 (1998). 
187 Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1032.  “On their face, however, the purposes of 
subsections 793(d) and (e) are mysterious because the statutes are so sweeping as to be 
absurd.”  Id. 
188 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the 
Espionage Act). 
189 Id. 
190 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.  “Doubts that the legislative history 
justifies the conclusion that Congress saw a general distinction between communication 
and publication are reinforced because the distinction is not theoretically sound in the 
context of the espionage statutes and cannot be applied in any sensible fashion.”  Edgar & 
Schmidt, supra note 16, at 1035. 
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knowingly and willfully . . . publishes . . . any classified information . . . 
concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United 
States. . .,” prosecution is a very viable option for the disclosure of the 
NSA program.191  The disclosure was knowing and willful and was 
accomplished by means of publishing on the front page of a national 
newspaper.192  Moreover, the New York Times knew the program was a 
highly classified governmental secret that had been leaked to it.193  
Finally, the element that requires that the subject of the disclosure 
concern communications intelligence also is met, as the NSA program 
seems to be exactly what Congress had in mind when it included the 
term “communications intelligence” in the definition section of the 
statute.194 
Furthermore, the legislative history of the COMINT statute is 
particularly helpful in this situation.195  The Chicago Tribune incident 
during World War II is eerily similar to the disclosure of the NSA 
program, as each of them instructed the United States’ deadly enemies of 
the methods by which America was gathering information about them, 
and they both occurred during armed conflicts.196  When the COMINT 
statute was enacted in 1950, it was in direct response to the Tribune 
incident, and it logically follows that Congress thought that the narrow 
category of press censorship mandated by the provision was necessary 
to maintain national security, into which the NSA program plainly fits.197 
However, it does not seem that the disclosure of the TFTP program 
could be applied in a similar fashion.  Just as the Espionage Act is vague 
as applied to the NSA disclosure, it is also ambiguous in terms of the 
TFTP operation.198  Under the Espionage Act, the subject matter of the 
communication is not the crucial element, but rather the means by which 
                                                 
191 18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (2000); see supra note 37 for the full text of the statute. 
192 See generally supra Part II.E. 
193 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 99, at A1.  “Nearly a dozen current and former officials, 
who were granted anonymity because of the classified nature of the program . . . .”  Id. 
194 18 U.S.C. § 798(b) (2000).  “The term ‘communication intelligence’ means all 
procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the obtaining of 
information from such communications by other than the intended recipients.”  Id.; see also 
supra note 37 (for the full text of the statute). 
195 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text (describing the legislative history of the 
COMINT statute). 
196 See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (explaining the historical setting in which 
the COMINT statute was passed). 
197 Id. 
198 See supra Part III.A (discussing the vagueness of the Espionage Act). 
Alson: Someone Talked! The Necessity of Prohibitions Against Publishing
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
1312 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
the communication occurred, and Congress did not intend for 
publishing to be criminalized.199 
Additionally, the COMINT statute cannot be applied to the 
publishing of the TFTP operation either.  While the statute does prohibit 
publishing, nowhere in the COMINT statute does the provision mandate 
the prosecution for the disclosure of the subject matter of financial 
intelligence.200  In 1950, Congress made a conscious choice by limiting 
the censorship of the press to the narrow field of communications 
intelligence and code systems.201  It can thus be inferred that Congress 
did not believe the rights of the press should be curtailed to limit the 
publishing of other classified information, including economic tracking 
and monitoring systems.202 
The Espionage Act was amended in 1950 after the Chicago Tribune 
incident shook the nation and Congress’ collective conscience, as 
Congress had determined that the media utilized excessive discretion in 
its decision to publish the secret of the breaking of the Japanese code.203  
Over half a century later, it is possible that history similarly taught 
Congress that the time has come to update the Federal Criminal Code to 
prohibit journalists from publishing other categories of classified 
intelligence information. 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION—A NECESSARY UPDATE 
Current federal statutes that allow criminal charges to be brought 
against those who publish certain types of confidential national security 
intelligence information are insufficient in today’s post-September 11th 
world.204  Specifically, while the COMINT statute can be applied to 
publishers of communications intelligence such as the disclosure of the 
NSA warrantless wiretap program, neither it nor the Espionage Act 
includes provisions that allow for prosecution of persons or entities that 
publish other confidential intelligence information.205 
                                                 
199 See supra note 135 (describing the uncertainty as to whether the prohibitive scope of 
the Espionage Act reaches publication). 
200 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2000); see supra note 37 (for the full text of the statute). 
201 Id. 
202 See supra note 144 (explaining the narrow focus of the COMINT statute). 
203 See supra notes 39-44 (discussing the direct relationship between the Chicago Tribune 
article and the COMINT statute). 
204 See supra Part III. 
205 See supra Part III.C. 
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Therefore, this Note proposes an additional statute to the Federal 
Criminal Code that prohibits the publishing of classified government 
programs that deal with the tracking and following of suspected 
terrorists’ financial activities.206  The statute, which could be located in 
the Code after the related provisions at 18 U.S.C. § 800, is based largely 
from the COMINT statute, as its wording is unambiguous and narrow.207  
With the twin goals of plugging a current breach in national security 
laws, while still protecting the freedom of the press, the following statute 
is proposed: 
A. Proposed 18 U.S.C. § 800208 
 (a) Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, 
furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an 
unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any 
manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United 
States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the 
detriment of the United States any classified information 
concerning the financial intelligence activities of the United 
States or any foreign government shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 
 (b) As used in subsection (a) of this section – 
 The term “classified information” means 
information which, at the time of a violation of this 
section, is, for reasons of national security, specifically 
designated by a United States Government Agency for 
limited or restricted dissemination or distribution; 
 The term “foreign government” includes in its 
meaning any person or persons acting or purporting to 
act for or on behalf of any faction, party, department, 
agency, bureau, or military force of or within a foreign 
country, or for or on behalf of any government or any 
person or persons purporting to act as a government 
                                                 
206 See infra note 208. 
207 See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text (discussing the focused language and 
scope of the COMINT statute). 
208 With the exception of the italicized language, the language of the proposed statute has 
been reproduced from the statutory language of the COMINT statute and its 
corresponding definitions. 
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within a foreign country, whether or not such 
government is recognized by the United States; 
 The term “financial intelligence activities” means all 
procedures and methods used in the monitoring of information 
related to financial data obtained from international financial 
institutions; 
 The term “unauthorized person” means any person 
who, or agency which, is not authorized to receive 
information of the categories set forth in subsection (a) 
of this section, by the President, or by the head of a 
department or agency of the United States Government 
which is expressly designated by the President to engage 
in financial intelligence activities for the United States. 
 (c) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the 
furnishing, upon lawful demand, of information to any 
regularly constituted committee of the Senate or House 
of Representatives of the United States, or joint 
committee thereof. 
 (d) Any person convicted of a violation of this 
section shall forfeit, to the United States irrespective of 
any provision of State law – 
 (1) any property constituting, or derived from, any 
proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as 
the result of such violation; and 
 (2) any of the person’s property used, or intended to 
be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate 
the commission of, such violation. 
B. Commentary 
The goal of proposed section 800 is to allow the prosecution of 
persons, including journalists and publishers, who disclose confidential 
programs or methods utilized by the government to monitor the 
transfers of funds that often occur in correspondence with terrorist 
activities.  As a shadowy enemy without an official nation, it is quite 
difficult to employ traditional methods to successfully discover the 
actions and future plans of terrorist organizations and individuals.  
Often, the best way to gain intelligence about terrorists is to observe the 
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residual effects of their actions, which include their manners of 
communications and means of funding their operations.  The COMINT 
statute prohibits the disclosure of classified programs that gain 
communications intelligence, and proposed section 800 will ban the 
disclosure, including the publishing, of manners of tracing financial 
activities. 
In addition, proposed section 800 will not unconstitutionally abridge 
the freedom of the press.  As at least four justices mentioned in the 
Pentagon Papers case, the Espionage Act, even with all of its 
troublesome statutory language, could in theory be applied to criminally 
prosecute journalists who disseminate certain government secrets.209  
Thus, because the language of proposed section 800 is unambiguous, 
includes definitions for potentially unclear terms, and is much more 
focused than the Espionage Act, the provision will pass a constitutional 
challenge on vagueness or overbreadth grounds and the judiciary also 
should have no hesitation in applying it.  Furthermore, both Morison and 
the recent AIPAC case indicate that courts will faithfully apply enacted 
statutes, especially when national security interests are at stake.210 
Moreover, similar to the COMINT statute, section 800 is an 
extremely targeted provision that seeks not to silence the press, but 
instead to protect vital anti-terrorist interests.211  Just as when Congress 
passed the COMINT statute to target disclosures similar to the Chicago 
Tribune’s publishing of cryptographic information in World War II, 
Congress would clearly intend section 800 to apply only to disclosures 
similar to the TFTP revelation, as the legislative history and 
Congressional debate would undoubtedly indicate.212  As a result, there 
would be no fear that section 800 would suppress the media from 
making any comments on national defense information, as the broad and 
defeated provision offered by the Wilson administration to Congress in 
1917 would have done.213  Such would be neither the intent nor the result 
of the proposed legislation. 
The tracking and combating of terrorist finances is a critical tool in 
the war on terror, and proposed section 800 would arm the government 
with a weapon that could allow it to fight the war without unnecessary 
                                                 
209 See supra Part II.C. 
210 See supra Part II.D. 
211 See supra Part III.A. 
212 See supra Part II.B. 
213 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (examining the defeat of the Wilson 
administration’s press censorship proposal). 
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interference from journalists.  After all, “[t]racking terrorist money trails 
is difficult enough without having our sources and methods reported on 
the front page of newspapers.”214 
In total, proposed section 800 serves two important purposes.  First, 
it fills a void in the Criminal Code by prohibiting the disclosure, 
particularly the publishing, of classified information regarding a crucial 
weapon in the war on terror, the tracking of terrorist finances.  As the 
war on terror is an unconventional war, it follows that unconventional 
methods must be utilized to give America its best opportunity for 
victory, and monitoring the money trail of terrorists is a critical weapon.  
Certainly, our enemies should not be able to learn of our classified 
methods of fighting terror by simply subscribing to the New York Times.  
Second, proposed section 800’s plain language and clear legislative 
history would unambiguously indicate that the freedom of the press is 
not unnecessarily abridged, as only a narrow, yet important, subject 
matter is prohibited from disclosure.  In sum, section 800 would impede 
American journalists from distributing this nation’s anti-terror secrets, 
while at the same time not unnecessarily abridging the freedom of the 
press. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As wars and conflicts evolve, so must the laws of the United States 
progress to ensure the survival and safety of its citizens.  Congress has 
done this in the past, as its enacted statutes regarding the disclosure of 
classified information have developed to guard against certain 
transgressions.  The statute that is proposed in this Note is a 
continuation of that development.  Instead of attempting a strained and 
misguided application of the Espionage Act, proposed section 800 would 
prohibit journalists from giving away narrow yet crucial secrets that 
have been illegally leaked to them through backchannels.  By passing 
such legislation, our newspapers at home, disenchanted leakers in the 
government, and our enemies abroad would realize that the United 
States government will not tolerate the disclosure of its secrets, whether 
traded in the dead of the night by spies or publicized in its newspapers.  
In a world where everyday is September 12, Congress should not wait 
for the occurrence of the nightmare scenario presented in Part I before it 
gets serious about fighting terrorism.  This Note’s proposed statute 
would be one small, yet necessary, step in the right direction towards 
                                                 
214 Levey, supra note 115, at 3-4. 
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ensuring that the situation recounted in Part I remains only a 
hypothetical. 
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